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Lindsey O Graham Act: Another stress test for India-Russia relations
This article is authored by Pravesh Kumar Gupta, associate fellow, Vivekananda International Foundation, New Delhi.
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The Lindsey O Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, signed into law by President Donald Trump on September 18, 2026, marks a significant escalation in secondary pressure against Russia’s energy revenues. By empowering the US President to impose tariffs of up to 100% on goods from the top five purchasers of Russian oil and gas which currently include India as the second-largest buyer after China. The legislation transforms what had been rhetorical and ad-hoc pressure into a standing statutory instrument. Its implications for India-Russia relations go beyond short-term energy trade. They test the resilience of a long-standing strategic partnership against the realities of multipolar competition and US economic leverage.
India’s purchase of discounted Russian crude since 2022 has been a rational response to market conditions. Russian oil has often accounted for roughly one-third to nearly half of India’s crude imports in recent periods, helping contain domestic fuel prices and inflation for a population of 1.4 billion. New Delhi has consistently framed these imports as a matter of sovereign energy security rather than political endorsement of Moscow’s war in Ukraine. The Graham Act directly challenges this framing by treating large-scale purchases as material support for Russia’s war machine and attaching potential economic costs to them.
The discretionary nature of the tariff authority is crucial. The law does not mandate automatic 100% tariffs; it leaves the decision, rate, and timing to the president, with periodic reassessment of the top five buyers. This design gives Washington flexibility and leverage over bilateral negotiations with India. It can be used as a bargaining chip in trade talks, a tool to extract concessions on other issues, or a signal of seriousness if Russia continues to reject peace negotiations. For India, the mere existence of this authority creates ongoing uncertainty for exporters and policymakers.
India-Russia relations rest on deeper foundations than oil alone. Decades of defence cooperation (including critical platforms and technology transfers), nuclear collaboration, space ties, and shared interest in a multipolar order has been the backbone of multifaceted cooperation. These elements are unlikely to unravel overnight. Russia remains a reliable partner that does not lecture India on domestic politics or demand alignment against China. In forums such as BRICS and the SCO, the two countries continue to find common ground.
Yet energy has become a central pillar of the post-2022 relationship. Sustained secondary pressure could accelerate efforts to de-dollarise bilateral trade, expand local-currency settlements, and deepen alternative logistics and financial channels. If US tariffs materialise at meaningful levels, both sides may invest more heavily in workarounds—further insulating their economic relationship from Western systems. Paradoxically, aggressive secondary sanctions risk strengthening the very parallel architectures that reduce the long-term effectiveness of US financial power.
New Delhi’s official response has been measured but firm. The Indian government reiterated that energy security remains non-negotiable, the potential impact on bilateral ties and global markets has been clearly conveyed to Washington, and India will take necessary measures to protect its economic interests. This language reflects continuity with India’s traditional multi-alignment. India is not prepared to subordinate its energy needs to US policy preferences, yet it also values the strategic partnership with Washington which is widely evident in Quad cooperation, defence deals, technology collaboration, and Indo-Pacific balancing against China.
The Graham Act, therefore, forces a continuous calibration. Temporary reductions in Russian oil volumes under earlier tariff pressure demonstrated that India can adjust when costs rise sharply. Full decoupling, however, remains improbable so long as Russian crude offers a clear price advantage and alternative supplies carry higher costs or geopolitical risks of their own. The result is likely to be managed diversification rather than rupture. For example, gradual shifts toward other suppliers (including the US when commercially viable), continued but more discreet Russian purchases, and intensified diplomatic engagement to secure exemptions, waivers, or delayed implementation.
For Russia, India’s continued purchases, however adjusted, provide both revenue and political legitimacy. Losing or significantly reducing the Indian market would tighten the fiscal constraints on Moscow and signal some sort of isolation from a major Global South power. For the United States, the legislation risks pushing India closer to Russia and China on systemic questions of economic order, even as New Delhi remains wary of excessive dependence on either. European carve-outs in the bill highlight an asymmetry that New Delhi is quick to note. For example, western countries that previously bought Russian energy received more flexible treatment once they began reducing dependence.
The Act also illustrates the limits of secondary sanctions in a fragmented global economy. When major Asian consumers prioritise affordability and security of supply, unilateral western measures face structural resistance. Success will depend less on the legal text than on the political will to impose costly tariffs on a strategic partner like India, and on whether those tariffs actually alter purchasing behaviour more than they damage bilateral trust.
Finally, based on the response made by India, it seems that The Graham Act is unlikely to impact India-Russia relations hugely. Nor does it compel an immediate Indian exit from Russian energy markets. It does, however, institutionalise a new source of friction that will shape the relationship for years. India will continue to prioritise energy security and strategic autonomy, while managing U.S. pressure through diplomacy, diversification, and selective adjustment. Russia will seek to retain the Indian market through discounts, flexible payment mechanisms, and deeper non-energy cooperation. The outcome will depend on how aggressively Washington deploys its new tariff authority, how flexibly New Delhi navigates competing demands, and whether global energy markets offer viable alternatives at acceptable cost. In essence, the legislation turns India-Russia energy ties into a live stress test of multipolar resilience against the residual power of US secondary sanctions.
(The views expressed are personal)
This article is authored by Pravesh Kumar Gupta, associate fellow, Vivekananda International Foundation, New Delhi.
