Will Lanka miss the peace bus again?

The LTTE says that the final push to secure Tamil Eelam by force is on the cards, writes PK Balachandran.

The Norwegian peace broker Erik Solheim is to meet the LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran in Kilinochchi on Wednesday with a message from the Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa.

Sri Lankans pin high hopes on this crucial meeting because their country is now on the threshold of yet another round of hostilities, already codenamed "Eelam War IV" by veteran defence analyst Iqbal Athas.

In the Tamil-speaking North, the LTTE has been saying that the "final push" to secure an independent Tamil Eelam by force is on the cards.

Thousands of Tamils have fled to the LTTE-controlled areas from government-controlled areas in Jaffna fearing a Sri Lankan onslaught.

In the Sinhala-speaking South there is increasing anger against the LTTE's killing spree.

And President Rajapaksa keeps wondering how long he will be able to keep the armed forces from retaliating.

The Solheim visit, with its high level meetings, offers yet another opportunity to the Sri Lankans to avoid war and settle the political issues underlying the 57-year-old Tamil-Sinhala conflict.

But the million dollar question is: Will they grab the opportunity or miss it, as they had done so many times before?

Many attempts had been made in the past, by Sri Lankans as well as non-Sri Lankans, to solve the problem.

But all these had lost their way for one reason or the other. During previous peace processes, the two parties were either jockeying for better positions or were buying time. They never discovered common ground.

Milestone I: India's bid

The first genuine attempt to get the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE together was made by India through the India-Sri Lanka Accord of July 1987.

But the accord did not enjoy the full consent of any of the warring parties. The Sri Lankan government felt cheated because it believed that it was on the verge of crushing the LTTE when the Indians intervened politically and militarily.

The LTTE, on the other hand, feared that the accord was but an Indian ploy to thwart its plans to secure an independent "Tamil Eelam".

From the mid 1980s, the LTTE has believed that India is basically using Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka only to browbeat Colombo into backing its own geopolitical interests.

Soon, opportunities arose to sabotage the accord. India found that it had taken on more than it could chew. It had not anticipated the difficulties that could be posed by the two parties.

However, India did help the Tamils get a modicum of recognition and power through the unification of the Tamil-speaking North and East and the setting up of a North Eastern Provincial Council (NEPC) with some devolved power under the new 13th amendment to the Sri Lankan constitution.

But to the LTTE, the 13th amendment was a far cry from an independent Tamil Eelam.

Also, it loathed to share power with other Tamil groups. To win over the LTTE, India tried to set up an Interim Administration giving the lion's share of places to it, including the chairmanship.

Money also changed hands to smoothen the passage. But all to no avail.

President JR Jayewardene said that he could not be seen to be dancing to the tune of a "terrorist" group.

The conflict between the President and the LTTE came to a head on the issue of appointing a chairman for the interim council.

The other issue, which rattled the accord, was the arrest of some senior LTTE cadres by the Sri Lankan navy, allegedly for smuggling weapons.

The government insisted that they be brought to Colombo to face investigations, but the LTTE appealed against it.

India did intercede with Colombo on the LTTE's behalf, but unsuccessfully. Eventually, the LTTE cadres committed suicide, triggering attacks on the Sinhala community in the East.

Anti-Indian feelings were also whipped up. President Jayewardene asked the Indians to disarm the Tigers. War had become inevitable.

The war between the LTTE and the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), which began in October 1987, ended in March 1990, with India losing 1,500 men.

Over 3,000 were wounded or disabled. Billions of rupees were spent on this misadventure, the longest armed intervention outside India's borders after independence.

However, even in the midst of war, India helped hold elections to the North Eastern Provincial Council (NEPC) in 1988.

The anti-LTTE Eelam Peoples' Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), backed by the IPKF, won the elections.

A Civil Volunteer Force (CVF) was created for the protection of the beleaguered new provincial government based in Trincomalee.

But the LTTE and the new Sri Lankan government headed by President R Premadasa, were hell bent on destroying the EPRLF government. Colombo denied even the bare essentials to it.

Premadasa was dead against the Indian presence in Sri Lanka. To consolidate his power and position, he wanted to win over certain powerful South Sri Lankan forces and the LTTE, both of which wanted India to quit immediately. Premadasa unhesitatingly gave marching orders to the Indians.

The President also believed that he could talk to the LTTE and settle the Tamil question.

Therefore, he began talks with it and helped it with weapons and other material to fight the IPKF.

This was much more than what India had bargained for. With pressure building up against the intervention in India also, the IPKF was withdrawn in March 1990. India went into a shell thereafter.

Milestone II: Premadasa's bid

President Premadasa's bid to negotiate with the LTTE was shortlived. The LTTE asked him to dissolve the North Eastern Provincial Council and order fresh elections.

But the President pointed out to constitutional difficulties. The LTTE also wanted him to repeal the 6th.amendment outlawing secessionist talk.

For Premadasa, agreeing to this seemed suicidal. Soon, he began to fear, and very rightly so, that an LTTE government in the North East would go for full independence.

The talks broke when the President asked the LTTE to de-commission its weapons before any fresh elections to the NEP.

The LTTE flatly refused. By then, it had also seen that Colombo was encouraging some anti-LTTE Tamil groups to counter its influence.

Its sense of insecurity shot up. One thing led to another rapidly, and in June 1990, Eelam War II began.

Milestone III: Kumaratunga's bid

The Premadasa era ended when the LTTE assassinated him in May 1993. In the 1994 parliamentary elections, war-weary Sri Lankans threw up a new leader, Chandrika Kumaratunga of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), who had portrayed herself as a peacenik.

She became Prime Minister and then President with multi-ethnic support.

Kumaratunga's line was that the LTTE should discuss the "core issue" - a permanent political solution.

She did not believe in interim patch work. Towards that end, she started serious discussions with all parliamentary parties on a devolution package to be incorporated in a brand new constitution. Several drafts came out between 1995 and 2000.

But the LTTE was wary about talking about a permanent solution when it was not strong enough to negotiate on such fundamental issues.

The LTTE wanted to discuss "urgent humanitarian issues" which affected the common war-affected Tamils.

These related to movement of people and goods, the embargoes, entry and exit points between government-held and rebel-held areas and coastal fishing.

But there was also an unstated aim - to consolidate itself and get greater freedom of movement and more resources for another bid to seize independence by force.

The government did relax the restrictions, but there was an underlying suspicion about the LTTE's intentions.

The LTTE suspected that the government was dragging its feet on relaxation and was insisting on discussing the final political solution only to buy time to prepare for war.

The LTTE rejected the devolution packages brought out by the government from time to time saying that they did not address the core concerns of the Tamils.

Because of her determination to bring peace, her bid to bring out a devolution package, Kumaratunga enjoyed the support of the international community and also India.

India shed its reserve vis-à-vis the Sri Lankan state and actively encouraged the Kumaratunga government to pursue peace and economic development.

The talks with the LTTE broke down in six months after four meetings and exchange of many letters.

The LTTE went to war. The world, including India, supported the Kumaratunga government.

India went ahead with training programmes for the Sri Lankan armed forces. China, Pakistan and Israel sold weapons to the government.

However, Kumaratunga's strategy of waging war for peace, did not work. The war went on for too long, draining the resources of the government and testing the patience of the people.

The LTTE was hitting where it hurt most - the capital city of Colombo.

In 2000, the military camps along the Vavuniya-Jaffna road fell like nine pins under a multi-pronged LTTE onslaught code named "Unceasing Waves".

Soon, the LTTE was knocking at the gates of Jaffna and asking the 30,000 Sri Lankan troops there to surrender.

The attack on Sri Lanka's only international airport in Katunayake near Colombo on July 24, 2001 broke the country's back.

The heavy military and civilian losses, coupled with a hike in shipping insurance rates, brought down the growth rate to minus 1.4 per cent.