Fifteen years ago, India and the United States (US) finalised the civil nuclear deal. The deal was never merely about nuclear energy. It was about removing a major impediment in bilateral ties and locking Delhi and Washington into a strategic embrace with an eye on potential Chinese belligerence.
US India ties are key in firming up a challenge to China (Reuters)
Since then, the relationship has continued to grow in all domains, including defence, security and intelligence, even if it has happened in fits and starts. But what drove George W Bush to invest American diplomatic capital, and Manmohan Singh to stake his government’s survival, is now reaching its logical conclusion. And this is happening under two radically different political figures, Joe Biden and Narendra Modi, from two different parties than the ones in-charge in 2008. Three factors are enabling this systemic shift.
The first is political clarity and commitment. Biden has taken a political call: India is a critical actor and improving the relationship with Delhi, as a part of the US’s focus on the Indo-Pacific, is essential. India won’t be an ally and that’s fine; it can perhaps be even more effective as a partner. The administration will not allow critics of Indian democracy to define the US’s national security posture. No global problem can be addressed without India in the room. From the National Security Council to the State Department to Pentagon, officials have said that they have a clear directive from their bosses — make the India relationship work or, in the words of one policymaker, “our grandchildren will be ruled by the Chinese”. The differences over Ukraine paradoxically reinforced this line of thinking, for Washington felt that its mistaken policies during the Cold War had locked Indian systems with Russia for decades.
This was a moment to change that by deepening cooperation as new rules of the game were being determined. Biden bet on Delhi as a friend to be wooed, methodically and for the long-term. The diaspora‘s growing influence helps, as does the fact that India isn’t a liability in US politics but commands support on both sides of the aisle. For the Indian side, Xi Jinping made the decision. Dashing Modi’s hopes for a reset in ties, Xi’s actions in 2014 (Chumar), 2016 (blocking India at Nuclear Suppliers Group), 2017 (Doklam) and 2020 (eastern Ladakh) ensured that India’s principal geopolitical contradiction was, no longer covertly but overtly, with China. Delhi couldn’t afford to hedge anymore. For India to grow its own capabilities, and bridge the gap with China, while managing the live security threat, US capital, technology, knowledge infrastructure, intelligence and diplomatic support, which helps open many other doors in the region and beyond, were essential. Modi bet on Washington as the partner of today and tomorrow. It helps that the US isn’t a liability in Indian politics anymore, notwithstanding the manufactured outrage on the Left and Right sporadically.
The second is the scale of diplomatic engagement. This year alone, both national security advisors (NSA’s), Jake Sullivan and Ajit Doval, have met in Washington and Riyadh. US secretary of state Antony Blinken and external affairs minister S Jaishankar speak often and have already met in Delhi and Hiroshima. The Indian commerce minister, Piyush Goyal, was in DC for trade talks and US commerce secretary, Gina Raimondo was in Delhi for the commercial dialogue. US treasury secretary Janet Yellen and finance minister Nirmala Sitharaman have already met twice this year. Modi’s principal secretary PK Mishra met Biden’s chief of staff Jeff Zients, while information technology minister Ashwini Vaishnaw spent time in Silicon Valley to explore semiconductor collaboration. Just this week, if US defence secretary Lloyd Austin finished a visit to Delhi, foreign secretary Vinay Kwatra is in Washington for a strategic trade dialogue. And NSA Sullivan is expected to travel to Delhi next week, to firm up the deliverables for Modi’s visit. At other levels too, diplomats have been in constant communication, both under the bilateral and Quad frameworks. This astonishing scale of State-to-State engagement is leading to a much deeper shift than those outside governments are able to know or capture.
The third is a common agenda. This writer argued back in January that the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (ICET) is the new Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), which had paved the way for the nuclear deal. ICET will be the defining framework for the relationship. Austin’s visit took forward the idea of a defence industrial roadmap embedded in ICET. India’s dreams of developing a military industrial complex rest on American capital and tech transfer; the US’s dreams of locking India into its wider defence architecture requires flexibility on export controls and a signal to its private sector to invest in India. The two countries are about to connect their defence innovation ecosystems and set up a fund to fuel startups. The White House is set to give a green signal to GE to manufacture jet engines in India. Expect a major semiconductor manufacturing push; talks are at an advanced stage with Micron about setting up an assembly, packaging and testing plant in Gujarat. And this is just a sampling of what ICET may deliver within five months of its existence.
For the first time in the diplomatic history of India and the US, they also have a convergence of interests across Asia. With I2U2 and a big joint infrastructure push, DC and Delhi are working together in a region where they have historically been at odds. Both countries want Israel’s integration into the region and the success of Abraham Accords. Both recognise the importance of the transition underway in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Both want stable energy markets.
And to the east, there is no Indo-Pacific and Quad without India. The public pronouncements may vary, but neither Delhi nor DC wants an Asia where China calls the shots. What each actor will do in a crisis is perhaps not the best yardstick to judge the relationship; the fact that both sides agree on the source of trouble, talk about it constantly and have bridged the gap on how far they will cooperate to deal with that challenge is remarkable progress in itself. As they prepare for Modi’s historic visit, both systems can pat themselves on the back. India-US ties are about to enter their best period ever.
Prashant Jha is the Washington DC-based US correspondent of Hindustan Times. He is also the editor of HT Premium. Jha has earlier served as editor-views and national political editor/bureau chief of the paper. He is the author of How the BJP Wins: Inside India's Greatest Election Machine and Battles of the New Republic: A Contemporary History of Nepal.Read More
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