E-Paper
BRICS at a turning point: India’s leadership and the road ahead
This article is authored by Janvi Singhi, independent researcher and Rear Admiral Girish Kumar Garg, (Retd).
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As the BRICS summit draws to an end in New Delhi, India’s objective should not be to manufacture unanimity within an increasingly diverse grouping. The real challenge is to demonstrate that BRICS can remain relevant and productive even when its members disagree and, at times, pursue competing strategic interests.
That challenge was starkly illustrated at the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in New Delhi in May. The ministers could not agree on a conventional joint statement amid differences over the conflict in West Asia, particularly between Iran and the UAE. India instead issued a Chair’s Statement and Outcome Document. Yet the outcome document also demonstrated that the members could find common ground across a remarkably wide range of issues. The lesson is important. Greater geopolitical weight does not necessarily produce greater cohesion. India's residency should adopt a pragmatic approach. BRICS does not require political uniformity; it needs economic effectiveness.
The most consequential aspects of India’s presidency may be its relatively low-profile agenda: The Economic Partnership Strategy 2030, global value chains, customs cooperation, logistics, standards, digital agriculture and MSME cooperation. An Indian pharmaceutical exporter gains little if customs procedures remain cumbersome. An electronics manufacturer cannot benefit fully from a logistics agreement if product standards differ substantially across markets. The real test is execution.
Customs information exchange, mutual recognition of standards, electronic documentation and better logistics can reduce transaction costs and make BRICS markets more accessible. But India should go further. The plan should not only be aimed at boosting intra-BRICS trade, but at building supply chains that are more versatile and effective. The recent troubles with transportation, energy supply and other critical provisions demonstrate that while effectiveness might be regarded as something positive, it might also pose serious risks.
The same principle applies to finance. BRICS is exploring more efficient cross-border payment systems and greater use of local currencies. India has also been advocating greater interoperability between payment systems. India does not need BRICS to replace the dollar. What it needs is greater choice and resilience in international trade and investment. Local-currency financing, interoperable payment systems and lower transaction costs can make alternative currencies more practical without seeking to displace the dollar overnight.
This approach is consistent with the direction of the New Development Bank (NDB). Its current strategy has a target of 30% of financing in local currencies, while the Bank is now preparing its next strategy cycle. The NDB has also been working towards greater rupee financing in India. India’s experience with digital public infrastructure and real-time payments gives it an opportunity to contribute meaningfully to this process. The goal is to build interoperable systems throughout BRICS, while taking all necessary precautions about economic instability, cyberthreats and illegal transactions.
There is, however, a paradox at the heart of India’s BRICS engagement. Greater economic integration can reduce dependence on Western markets, but it could simultaneously increase India’s dependence on China. China’s enormous manufacturing and trading weight makes it an indispensable economic partner within BRICS. Yet excessive concentration in Chinese supply chains could simply create another form of vulnerability. India should therefore measure the success of BRICS integration not merely by the growth of intra-BRICS trade, but by the diversification and resilience of supply chains.
The best result would be networks connecting Indian manufacturing with Brazilian agriculture, African resources, Gulf capital, Indonesian production, Russian energy and Chinese industry when appropriate from an economic standpoint but also promoting good domestic performance in India. Strategic autonomy should not imply strategic isolation. India may cooperate with China wherever their goals coincide while seeking alternative sources and capacities in strategic sectors. For India the key question is: Does BRICS represent an increase in strategic alternatives or just another dependency shift?
Critical minerals serve as a good test of the BRICS' capability of transitioning from talk to action. Lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite and rare earth elements will play increasing roles in the processes of development of e-mobility, renewable energy, advanced electronics, telecommunications and military technologies. The uneven distribution of the resources will add to the challenges created by the progress of the global energy and technology transition. In terms of resources, production capabilities, technologies and large consumer markets, BRICS has a unique mix of the assets. However, resources alone do not build resilience. In this regard, one should take into account the whole production chain, i.e. exploration and extraction, processing, metallurgy, production and recycling.
Consequently, India has the opportunity to promote a BRICS critical minerals partnership, commencing with collaboration in geological data acquisition and evolving toward collaborative exploration and processing endeavors, technological know-how transfer, Strategic Reserves establishment, and creating supply contracts for a long term. The aim must remain obvious: Achieve the necessary access to critical minerals while mitigating the emergence of new dependencies.
It must be understood that another aspect of resilience to be dealt with by BRICS is the maritime aspect. A great share of BRICS trade, which comprises energy, food, raw materials, manufactured goods is conducted via the seas. Thus, disruption of any major sea route or chokepoint can affect the economy of regions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz.
Cooperation of BRICS in logistics should include not only customs and paperwork, but also port access, maritime logistics, supply chain visibility and resilience of waterways. This is particularly significant in times of conflicts disrupting the main maritime corridors. Prime Minister Modi has outlined the significance of navigation freedom and safety of seafarers and resilient supplies including cooperation in aspects like shipbuilding.
India is particularly well placed to promote this agenda. Its geographical position gives it a natural interest in secure and efficient maritime connectivity between Asia, Africa, West Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific.
This need not turn BRICS into a military or maritime-security alliance. Rather, practical cooperation on maritime trade resilience, port efficiency, disaster response and commercial supply chains would complement India’s wider commitment to a free, open and stable Indo-Pacific.
BRICS expansion has also changed the nature of its formation. It is no longer just a group of five emerging economies but a conglomeration of major energy producers, commodity exporters, manufacturing countries, and countries with strategically important locations in Asia, Africa, west Asia, and Latin America. This gives BRICS greater global weight, but also makes consensus more difficult.
India should resist defining BRICS as an anti-western platform. The Global South is not necessarily seeking to replace one dominant power with another. Its principal demand is for a greater voice, fairer representation and more responsive institutions governing global finance, trade, technology and development. India can play a distinctive role here as a bridge, agenda-setter and voice of the wider developing world. Its strategic autonomy allows it to work simultaneously with the US and Europe on technology and investment, with Russia on energy and critical minerals, with the Gulf on connectivity and energy, and with China within BRICS where interests converge. These relationships need not be mutually exclusive.
The sustainability of BRICS will be determined by its capability to evolve from a platform that only communicates its dissatisfaction against the world’s existing order. The organisation may not revolutionise the global system but facilitate the creation of several options such as improved supply chains, variety of financial options, a great amount of development finance, a compatible digital infrastructure, better transportation of commodities and collaboration on minerals.
The measure of success should not be the number of paragraphs in the New Delhi Declaration. It should be whether, five years from now, an Indian company can trade more easily with a partner in Brazil, raise finance in local currency, move goods through a more efficient logistics network, access alternative sources of critical minerals and conduct digital transactions across borders at lower cost.
That is the kind of BRICS that can remain relevant despite geopolitical differences. India does not need to make BRICS a bloc. It needs to make it useful. If New Delhi follows through, India’s presidency in BRICS in 2026 will be valuable not because it settled disputes within the bloc, but because it established a precedent that cooperation is achievable even if there are differences on core issues.
(The views expressed are personal)
This article is authored by Janvi Singhi, independent researcher and Rear Admiral Girish Kumar Garg, (Retd).
