Looking beyond the Trump-Xi meeting in Washington

This article is authored by KS Tomar, strategic affairs columnist and senior political analyst, Shimla.

When Chinese President, Xi Jinping lands at Joint Base Andrews on September 23, US President, Donald Trump is expected to personally receive him on the tarmac—a rare honour normally not extended to visiting heads of State. The gesture is particularly striking because when Trump arrived in Beijing in May, Xi did not meet him at the airport; the reception was led by Chinese Vice-President Han Zheng, with Xi giving Trump the formal welcome the following day. Trump’s decision to meet Xi personally at the airfield, therefore, carries significance beyond protocol.

Chinese President Xi Jinping (X/@ANI)

The symbolism is unmistakable. The two countries remain strategic competitors, yet their leaders are investing heavily in personal diplomacy to prevent that rivalry from becoming uncontrolled confrontation. Xi’s visit will include a formal White House welcome, military review, State dinner and further meetings, turning the September 24 summit into a carefully choreographed combination of diplomacy, ceremony and hard bargaining.

After nearly four years, Trump and Xi are meeting in Washington at a moment when trade, tariffs, rare earths, Artificial Intelligence (AI), Taiwan and wider geopolitical conflicts have become interconnected. The summit is therefore much more than another meeting between the leaders of the world’s two largest economies. It is a test of whether strategic rivalry can be managed through direct negotiation.

For India, summit is especially important. New Delhi has been carefully balancing relations with Washington, Moscow and Beijing. A Trump-Xi understanding would not automatically alter India’s strategic position, but it could change the environment in which India conducts that balancing act.

Trump’s second-term foreign policy has developed differently from the expectations created by his election campaign. His stated preference was to reduce America’s involvement in prolonged conflicts, yet Washington remains deeply engaged with the Iran conflict while the Ukraine war continues unresolved. This has compelled Trump to move from the language of withdrawal towards active diplomacy aimed at extracting agreements from adversaries and allies alike.

The growing importance of personal diplomacy reflects this shift. Trump appears to believe that direct engagement with leaders such as Xi and Vladimir Putin can achieve results that conventional diplomatic processes have struggled to deliver. His approach is transactional: Tariffs can become negotiating instruments, sanctions can become leverage and economic relationships can be linked to broader strategic bargaining.

China presents the biggest test of this strategy. Beijing cannot be treated simply as an economic competitor because China is simultaneously a trading power, technological rival, military power and an influential actor in Russia, Iran and the wider Global South.

There is also a practical reason for the change. Strategic competition with China cannot continue indefinitely on every front without imposing costs on the American economy. The existing trade arrangement is approaching its November deadline, while rare-earth controls and technology restrictions remain major sources of friction. Stabilising one part of the relationship could give Trump greater room to deal with other international crises.

The consequence is a new form of diplomacy: Confrontation remains possible, but negotiation has become equally important.

Trade will remain the immediate issue. Washington wants greater access for American goods and is considering limited tariff reductions on non-strategic products, while Beijing wants greater certainty over American tariffs and technology restrictions. The two sides are also discussing whether the existing trade truce can be extended beyond November.

Rare earths may prove even more strategically important. China’s dominant position in critical-mineral processing gives Beijing considerable leverage over industries ranging from electronics and automobiles to defence and AI. Washington wants reliable supplies, while Beijing wants American restrictions on advanced technology to be restrained.

The US, however, has signalled that it is not prepared simply to exchange export-control concessions for Chinese rare-earth supplies. This makes the issue less a straightforward trade bargain and more a test of strategic leverage.

AI has added a new and potentially explosive dimension to the relationship. US officials have accused leading Chinese AI companies of extracting large quantities of information from American frontier AI models. Beijing has rejected the allegations and portrayed the US approach as an attempt to restrict China’s technological development.

The dispute illustrates how the US-China contest has moved beyond traditional trade. AI models, advanced semiconductors, computing power, data and technological know-how are increasingly viewed through the lens of national security.

Washington and Beijing are now discussing not merely who sells technology to whom, but how AI should be developed, controlled and protected against misuse. US treasury secretary, Scott Bessent, is also due to discuss AI risks, trade and rare earths with Chinese Vice-Premier He Lifeng ahead of the leaders’ meeting.

This makes AI one of the most consequential issues at the summit. Unlike a tariff, which can be raised or lowered through negotiation, technological advantage can determine economic and military power for decades.

Then comes Taiwan—the issue with the greatest potential to disrupt any broader understanding.

Beijing wants Washington to oppose Taiwan independence more explicitly, while American partners in Japan and elsewhere will be watching closely for any indication that US security commitments could become bargaining instruments in an economic negotiation.

For China, Taiwan is a core sovereignty issue. For the US, it is linked to its wider Indo-Pacific strategy and relationships with regional allies. Consequently, even if Trump and Xi avoid a direct confrontation over Taiwan, the language they use will be closely examined across Asia.

The elaborate protocol surrounding Xi’s visit is itself noteworthy. Trump is expected to receive Xi at Andrews before hosting him at the White House, where the two leaders will participate in a formal arrival ceremony and military review, followed by a state dinner attended by prominent American technology and business leaders. Xi and Peng Liyuan are also scheduled for a private tea and a visit to the National Archives.

This combination of ceremony and bargaining is characteristic of the summit. The pageantry may project warmth, but underneath it lies a difficult negotiating agenda involving AI, tariffs, rare earths, fentanyl, detained foreigners and possible Chinese investment in the US automobile market.

The presence of major technology executives is also significant. The involvement of corporate leaders reflects the reality that the US-China relationship can no longer be separated into neat economic, technological and security compartments.

Europe has a particular reason to watch the summit carefully. For European governments, the central concern is not merely whether Washington and Beijing reduce tariffs. It is whether the US begins reaching major understandings with China that affect European security and economic interests without adequate European participation.

A US-China accommodation could reduce global economic uncertainty, but it could also expose Europe’s dependence on decisions taken by two major powers. European countries are simultaneously managing relations with Washington, China and Russia while dealing with the consequences of the Ukraine war.

If Trump establishes even a limited understanding with Xi, European diplomacy could acquire greater space on trade and security. But if Washington makes concessions involving Taiwan, technology or Russia-related issues, European governments may have to reassess their own strategic calculations.

The psychological impact of the summit could be particularly significant in Asia.

Japan, South Korea, Australia and Taiwan are closely watching the language Trump uses on Taiwan. The concern is not necessarily that Washington will abandon its existing position, but that security commitments could become bargaining instruments in a broader economic negotiation. That perception alone could influence regional defence planning.

At the same time, a stable US-China relationship could reduce the danger of accidental escalation in the Indo-Pacific. The paradox is clear: Dialogue can lower immediate tensions, but an agreement perceived as weakening deterrence could generate new anxieties among American partners.

The summit is unlikely by itself to settle either conflict. Its importance lies in the possibility that Trump and Xi may discover areas where their interests overlap.

On Iran, China has substantial economic ties with Tehran. If Washington seeks Chinese cooperation on Iranian oil, sanctions or regional stability, Beijing could potentially use its economic relationship as diplomatic leverage. But China also has its own interests in maintaining access to West Asian energy and resisting unilateral American pressure.

Ukraine presents an even more complicated calculation. Washington wants Beijing to use its influence over Moscow, while China maintains close economic ties with Russia. The issue also carries a wider economic dimension because Washington is applying pressure to countries that continue purchasing Russian energy.

The summit could create a channel for discussing Ukraine without necessarily producing a peace agreement. The same applies to Iran: diplomatic communication may improve, but the underlying strategic differences will remain.

Another issue likely to receive attention is fentanyl. Washington wants Beijing to take stronger action against the supply of precursor chemicals used in the production of the synthetic opioid.

This issue illustrates the transactional character of the relationship. What may appear at first to be a law-enforcement problem has become part of the broader US-China economic and diplomatic negotiation.

Washington is also expected to raise cases involving Americans and other foreigners detained in China. These issues may not dominate the summit, but they provide additional areas where Trump can seek specific concessions from Xi.

The larger significance of the Trump-Xi meeting is that neither Washington nor Beijing appears capable of eliminating the other as a strategic competitor. What they can potentially do is manage the competition.

That distinction matters. A trade truce is not a strategic settlement. Cooperation on rare earths does not resolve Taiwan. Dialogue on AI does not eliminate the technology rivalry. Discussion of Ukraine does not end the Russia-West confrontation. And an understanding over Iran does not remove the competing interests of Washington, Beijing and Tehran.

The Washington summit, therefore, represents an experiment in managed rivalry. Trump wants agreements that demonstrate the value of his transactional diplomacy; Xi has strong incentives to prevent uncontrolled confrontation while preserving China’s strategic autonomy.

The extraordinary airport reception may capture the mood better than any formal communique. It shows that strategic competition and diplomatic engagement are no longer opposites. The two can coexist because neither Washington nor Beijing can afford an open-ended confrontation on every front.

The outcome will be measured not only by what Trump and Xi announce, but also by what they leave unresolved. In today’s fractured international system, preventing rivalry from becoming confrontation may itself be a significant diplomatic objective.

(The views expressed are personal)

This article is authored by KS Tomar, strategic affairs columnist and senior political analyst, Shimla.