Terms of Trade | The "India is democratic" debate is pointless. Here's why

The plutocratic turn in Indian democracy is ideology agnostic and it has pretty much killed inner-party democracy across the board

This edition of the column is meant to provoke, perhaps even offend, a lot of eminent political scientists. In the past few years, influential voices in western media and academic ecosystems have debated the question of whether or not India is still a democratic country. The trigger for this debate seems to be the second consecutive victory of the BJP under Narendra Modi in 2019. The participants in the debate include young and old political scientists and their claims and counter-claims around so-called indices of democracy.

The trigger for the democracy debate seems to be the second consecutive victory of the BJP under Narendra Modi in 2019. (HT Archive/For Representative Purposes)

This column does not intend to serve as a survey of literature on the debate or examine any specific part of it. What it seeks to do is to argue that this debate is actually pointless. This is not because it lacks methodological rigour. The reason is that it has very little use in understanding politics as it is being and is likely to be practised in India. This argument is best understood in five related points.

What exactly is democracy?

If one were to take the purist’s idea of democracy being synonymous with the sovereignty of people at large, very few countries will qualify as one. Even if one were to ignore the fact that the people at large have very little say in policy making between elections, almost all electoral democracies, India included, suffer from institutional capture of various kinds, which tilt the balance of power in the favour of a privileged minority. From a candidate winning the US Presidential elections despite losing the popular vote, to almost all winning candidates having far more wealth than the average voter in India, there are several examples of this institutional capture of democracy. Engagement with this kind of democratic erosion isn’t very fashionable today (but more on this later).

The interplay of democracy and desired values

This is a more complicated terrain. Today, we (like to) take certain things, such as basic human rights and equality, for granted in functional democracies. In practice, it is not uncommon for the “democratic state” to violate these principles with acts of either omission or commission. The State looking the other way when vigilante groups target people from a particular community (such as Muslims in India) or politically aiding decisions such as criminalizing abortions (as the overturning of Roe versus Wade judgment by a Republican nominated and dominated US Supreme Court) are examples of such democratic violations.

While it is perfectly alright to criticize such acts from a normative perspective and bemoan institutional complicity in them, the basic question is often left unanswered here. If electoral democracy is indeed the sovereignty of the majority – this being the practical transactional form of sovereignty of the people – what is one supposed to do if the majority actually endorses such regressive policies? While this is an undesirable trajectory, it is not exactly undemocratic. There are no easy answers here.

The problems with uncritical celebration of democratization and institutions

Many eminent social scientists argue that institutions (especially unelected ones) are the ultimate defenders of democracy. There is now a growing number of people, including in India, who argue that institutions are dominated by an elite minority which is only self-serving in nature. They see democratization, especially of the social variety as an essential pre-requisite to rectify these institutions.

A brief historical recap is enough to prove that neither side is being entirely truthful. The elite, who have historically run institutions, have very little material incentive to rebel against the system per se even if it is being undermined by the executive for political purposes. If the political scientists who are banking too much on institutional checks and balances were to speak to their mainstream economist colleagues, they would be told that only “irrational” institutional gatekeepers would take on the political leadership as it would entail a risk of material loss. In India, the interplay between institutions and political overreach has often depended on the strength of the executive, as has been argued by political scientist Milan Vaishnav in a recent paper.

Democratization, while an ideal objective, has often been used as an alibi for institutional destruction in India. Anthropologist Jeffrey Witsoe’s book Democracy against Development: Lower-Caste Politics and Political Modernity in Postcolonial India – it traces the rise and fall of Lalu Prasad Yadav in Bihar’s politics – is a fine exposition of this argument. To argue that democratization is an effective tool against negating the historical injustices of the past is one thing, but to extend this argument and portray it as the most virtuous thing in a democracy (thereby turning a blind eye to the institutional weakening it causes) is completely another. A lot of secular-democratic voices in India are guilty on this count. This is exactly why they are unable to understand the backlash against such democratization which is feeding the BJP’s electoral success at the moment.

Longing for status-quo-ante without engaging with the dialectics of democracy

On the subject of elections, discussions on democracy or lack of it in India have to descend quite a few intellectual floors to engage with the question of electoral competition. This is because the parties which are expected to defeat the BJP (and reverse the weakening of democracy) do not themselves have a great track record when it comes to democratic principles.

Most state governments are actually run from the chief ministers’ offices with very little investment in the principle of collective responsibility or accountability at the level of cabinet or the legislature (this is often the criticism which is made against the Modi government). Corruption, especially in the mobilization of political finance, is a way of life for several Indian parties. And ignoring long-term economic gains to divert resources for securing electoral gains is now a common trait across governments in India. Exploiting social fissures for acing the first-past-the-post competition is another such issue.

The short point is, one can legitimately accuse the BJP of using these fault lines, perhaps even at an unprecedented scale -- but it certainly cannot be accused of using such tactic for the first time. It makes perfect sense for extant politicians to press for status quo ante given their entrenched interests in the system. But ignoring these questions in academic analyses does not make us any wiser.

The atrophying of class is the biggest problem in India’s democracy

Lest one gets the wrong idea, this is not a reiteration of obsolete 20th-century communist party-style polemics.

Why should a country which had to distribute free food grains to almost 60% of its population during the pandemic have the most expensive elections in the world? This, in my view, is the central fault line which is emaciating Indian democracy on a daily basis. The plutocratic turn in Indian democracy is ideology agnostic and it has pretty much killed inner-party democracy across the board. With elections becoming a game with an (exorbitant) minimum spending threshold, it is almost impossible for a new political player to enter the fray. Some who do manage to break this barrier have actually joined the game rather than chart a different course.

What explains this insurmountable class barrier which has made democratic competition in India a privileged club? Conspiracy theories or moral degradation, tempting as they sound, are not the answer to this question. While a large majority of Indians continue to live in what can only be described as penury, it is extremely difficult to think of a coherent set of political praxis to make them rebel against the system. The political class is well aware of its interest in not doing anything which pushes this majority into losing all stakes in the system. The growing competition to offer freebies is meant to keep this majority happy.

Does this mean business as usual will continue forever in Indian democracy? This will depend on whether the political class can maintain a balance between protecting the interests of the class which funds politics and providing the underclass with enough. The day this balance cannot be maintained, Indian politics will spill over from the parliamentary to the extra-parliamentary theatre.

While the ongoing institutional destruction is indeed a matter of concern, it is more likely to accelerate elite exodus and derail upward mobility than cause a political explosion.

Every Friday, HT’s data and political economy editor, Roshan Kishore, combines his commitment to data and passion for qualitative analysis in a column for HT Premium, Terms of Trade. With a focus on one big number and one big issue, he will go behind the headlines to ask a question and address political economy issues and social puzzles facing contemporary India.

The views expressed are personal