Ukraine is racing desperately to counter Russia’s ballistic missiles

With Europe’s help, the country can limit the pounding but not eliminate it

KYIV HAS been under Russian bombardment for years, but in late August its resolve was tested as never before. Over the five days to September 1st the city was hit almost hourly by waves of jet-powered drones, followed by ballistic missiles. The Russians use the drones to overwhelm Ukrainian radar networks before launching the rockets. In July, across Ukraine, 437 civilians were killed, and the figures for August are expected to be just as bad. The attacks continued almost as intensely until September 6th, when they stopped briefly to allow Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, two American envoys, to shuttle safely from Moscow to Kyiv. As soon as they departed the strikes resumed; on September 7th three civilians were killed.

This photograph shows smoke rising following Russian missiles strike in Kyiv, Ukraine, early on September 8, 2026, amid Russian invasion in Ukraine. A wave of strong explosions rang out in Kyiv, AFP journalists said, as Russia resumed strikes on the Ukrainian capital after a three-day halt. Russian President Vladimir Putin had ordered the pause in attacks as US President Donald Trump's envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner visited the Russian and Ukrainian capitals at the weekend. (AFP)

Ukraine is struggling to counter Russia’s new, much faster Geran-4 and -5 drones, which fly at up to 600kph and are rolling off production lines at 3,000 per month. Their turbojet engines are mainly Chinese-supplied, but some are made in Russia using 3D printers smuggled from the West. They and the similar but larger Banderol are more like low-cost cruise missiles than earlier propeller-driven designs. Ukraine’s F-16s are running short of American-made AIM-120 and AIM-9 missiles, and need them to shoot down conventional cruise missiles.

Ukraine is working on building its own drone interceptors to stop the jet drones. But the problem of ballistic missiles is even harder. Out of 57 launched in the first eight days of August, only one is known to have been shot down. The Ukrainians ceased publishing the morale-sapping statistics until August 28th, when they reported that seven ballistic missiles were intercepted the previous night.

The reason is simple. Ukraine’s stock of Patriot PAC-3 interceptors, the only truly effective counter for ballistic missiles that it has available, is all but exhausted. Russia’s production of its most lethal missiles has accelerated to around 100 a month, split between 60 Iskander-Ms and 40 RM-48Us. The interceptions on August 27th were thanks to a dribble of PAC-3s bought by European allies. More significant deliveries are unlikely. Donald Trump’s war against Iran has left America’s own Patriot magazine depleted. No one wants to give up their own interceptors when there is little prospect of replacing them.

There are some promising developments, but none that will afford Ukraine short-term relief. Later this year Ukraine will get a couple of older French-Italian SAMP/T air-defence batteries, along with their Aster interceptors. They will be followed by eight newer SAMP/T NG versions next year. The new system has a more advanced radar for the final stage of guidance and can handle multiple manoeuvring ballistic missiles, such as Russia’s Iskander-M. The Aster has a warhead that explodes next to the incoming missile, rather than the PAC-3’s “hit-to-kill” impact. But French army sources claim it outperforms the Patriot in some respects. It is also less than half the $7m price of the latest export version of the PAC-3.

Yet the SAMP/T NG has yet to prove itself in combat, notes Fabian Hoffman, a missile analyst. MBDA, the European missile firm that builds the Aster, is cranking up production but will not reach 300 a year until 2028. Ukraine could get a licence to make its own Asters, but that too will take time. MBDA is about to start making the less capable PAC-2s in Germany under licence, at a rate of around 200 a year. Most of those could go to Ukraine (provided NATO countries, which have ordered 1,000 units, agree). But they will not be a game-changer.

What might make a difference would be a project described as a “moonshot”: the Ukrainian-led, pan-European Freyja project. It aims to give Ukraine and its European allies a much lower-cost, higher-volume alternative to the PAC-3 that will work with NATO-standard radars and data links. Fire Point, a Ukrainian company with particularly close links to government that makes attack drones and the long-range Flamingo cruise missile, is the lead developer. The planned interceptor is based on its short-range FP-7 ballistic missile. The sensors, guidance and command systems will come from 12 European defence firms, including France’s Thales, Italy’s Leonardo, Germany’s Diehl and Sweden’s Saab.

Fire Point is under pressure to show quick results, and claims it could have a successful ballistic missile interception by mid-2027. Mr Hoffman is sceptical. But if the price is anywhere near as low as the planned $700,000, it does not have to match the performance of PAC-3 or Aster, since it can be used in greater numbers. Matthew Bint of the International Institute for Strategic Studies thinks that at best Freyja may have some operational capability by 2028.

For now, Ukraine is pursuing the only two options it has left. The first is to harden and conceal infrastructure and industrial targets, while ensuring a sufficient supply of spare parts. The second is a so-called “left-of-launch” strategy to reduce the number of missiles available to Russia by hitting the factories that make them and striking their launchers before they can be fired.

Ukraine is hoping to add several new ballistic missiles of its own within the coming months. These include the promising Sapsan, built by Pivdenmash, a state-owned company descended from Soviet-era rocket builders, and two models from Fire Point: the FP-7 and the bigger, longer-range FP-9. The hope is that their high speed will make them better than drones at hitting mobile missile-launchers before they can “shoot and scoot”. That, however, is a tall order: even America, with its complete air supremacy over Iran, has struggled to eradicate the country’s mobile launchers.

Hence Mr Bint advocates going after factories that make crucial components: “They should identify single points of failure in the supply chain.” In March Ukraine hit a plant in Bryansk that made electronic components for Iskander missiles. Many such factories are still poorly defended.

Nonetheless, the problem is structural, says Mr Hoffman: producing ballistic missiles at scale is cheaper and easier than making enough interceptors to shoot them down. In Ukraine, the ground war may favour the defence. But the opposite is true of the air campaigns—on both sides.